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LIST OF PARTIES
The caption of the case on appeal contains the names of
all parties involved in the case in chiefJ

Plaintiff Annette

Belden1s case against Dalbo, Inc. and Dale Peel was settled prior
to trial with the knowledge and consent ofl the third-party defendant and his counsel and Annette Beldon i$ not a party to this
appeal.

ISSUES PRESENTED
The respondents would agree withI the issues presented as
set forth in appellant's brief and would take issue only with the
statement in paragraph 3 regarding whether the court abused its
discretion in allowing testimony regarding the extra-marital
affair to go before the jury.

Such language appears nowhere in

the trial transcript and respondent would!restate this merely as:
Whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing
testimony of the relationship between Annette Beldon and Martin
L. Lingwall.
Another issue presented here, although by appellant's
brief rather than the appeal in general, is whether the affidavits of the jurors in the trial court may be properly considered
by this court in determining the issues presented by this appeal.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 0^ THE
STATE OF UTAH
ANNETTE ELLERTSEN BELDEN,

)

Plaintiff,
vs.
DALBO, INC., and DALE
RANDOLPH PEEL,
Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs
and Respondents,

Casj* No. 20054

vs.
MARTIN R. LINGWALL,
Third-Party Defendant
and Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents find the appellant's statement of the case
to be substantially correct and adequate [for purposes of this
appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT^
I.
The appellant has improperly inc luded affidavits of
jurors and former counsel in his appellant brief.

Evidence is

not admissible on appeal if not presented to the trial court and
the law is clear that, absent evidence of misconduct or verdict
by chance, jurors may not impeach their own verdict.
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The affida-

vits included in the appellant's brief as Appendix A-1 through
A-3 are incompetent for the purposes of impeaching the jury verdict and are improperly included in appellant's brief.

The affi-

davit of counsel included as Appendix A-4 should more properly
have been made a part of the record during the motion for new
trial and should not be considered as part of appellant's brief.
II.
The case of Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982),
was decided approximately one month after the jury returned a
verdict in the present case and should, therefore, have no application to the present case.
III.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Dixon v. Stewart,
supra, decision would apply to the present case, this case presents the situation described in that decision as an exception to
the requirement that the jury be instructed regarding the effects
of its finding of comparative negligence.

This case involved an

initial complaint against the defendants by the passenger on the
motorcycle against the driver of the truck involved, a thirdparty complaint by that driver against the driver of the motorcycle and also involved issues relating to the application of the
Utah guest statute, which has since been found unconstitutional.
The issues involved were complex and instructions relating to the
effects of a finding of comparative negligence would necessarily
have brought evidence before the jury of the settlement between
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plaintiff, Annette Belden, and defendant Dalbo and Dale Peel and
would have been prejudicial to those defendants.

Despite

appellant's contention, there is no indication in the record that
a refusal by the trial court to instruct the jury regarding the
effects of its finding of comparative negligence lead to any
error whatsoever.

The damages found by tne jury as reported in

its special verdict do bear a significant relationship to the
evidence, or lack thereof, and were not inadequate, as a matter
of law.
The decision by the trial court jiot to instruct the jury
on the effects of its finding of comparative negligence was,
therefore, correct even under the guidelines of Dixon v. Stewart,
supra.
IV.
Evidence of the relationship betjtfeen Martin Lingwall and
Annette Belden was relevant to the issues of the state of mind of
the appellant at the time the accident oc burred and did not
create any prejudice to the appellant.

The very brief discussion

of the relationship is found in the trans cript of the trial which
covered approximately three days and entaliled testimony by
several witnesses.

There was no discussion of any extra-marital

sexual activity between the appellant and Annette Belden.

The

testimony concerning the relationship was relevant to the case
and created no prejudice to the appellant

-3-

ARGUMENT
I.
THE INCLUSION OF JUROR AFFIDAVITS IN
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IS IMPROPER AND THE
AFFIDAVITS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY
THIS COURT ON APPEAL.
Aside from the general principle that issues and evidence not presented to the trial court will not be considered on
appeal, the appellant's attempt to include jurors' affidavits
impeaching the jury verdict in its appellate brief flies in the
face of several clear decisions of this court holding that
jurors, by affidavit, may not impeach their own verdict, absent
evidence that the verdict was determined by chance or bribery.
The most recent decision supporting this principle is Rosenlof v.
Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372 (Utah 1983).

That case involved a claim

of misrepresentation against a vendor of real property and a
third-party complaint against the real estate agent who had
arranged the sale.

During deliberations, the jury transmitted a

question to the trial judge regarding division of liability between the defendants in the case.

After consulting counsel, the

court formulated a response which, among other things, suggested
a rereading of the jury instructions and verdict forms.
returned a verdict which contained a mathematical error.

The jury
On

motion for a new trial, counsel for the defendant presented an
affidavit of the jury foreman relating to the error.

The court,

quoting Wheat v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 122 Utah 418, 428-429, 250
P.2d 932, 937 (1952) , stated:
To permit litigants to get jurors to
sign affidavits or testify to matters
-4-

discussed in connection with their functions as jurors would open che door to
inquiry into all manner of things which a
losing litigant might consider improper:
misconceptions of evidence or law, offers
of settlement, personal experiences, prejudice against litigants or their causes
or the classes to which they belong. It
would be an interminable and totally
impracticable process. Such post-mortems
would be productive of no end of mischief
and render service as a juror unbearable.
If jurors were so circumscribed in their
deliberations, it is likely that judge and
counsel would have to be present in the
jury room attempting to monitor and regulate their thought and discussions into
approved channels. Fortunately, jurors
are under no such limitations, but are
allowed freedom in their deliberations.
See also, Groen v. Tri-O-Inc., 667 P.2d 5^8 (Utah 1983); State v.
Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981); and Johnsdm v. Simons, 551 P.2d
515 (Utah 1976).
The clear weight of authority indicates that appellant's
attempt to admit juror affidavits to impeach the verdict is
clearly improper and these affidavits should not be considered by
the court in determining the issues on appeal.
The attempt by appellant's counsel1 to admit the affidavit of Stephen L. Henriod is improper not only in that it
attempts to admit evidence on appeal whicl^ should more properly
been included in the record on motion for a new trial, but also
should be stricken insofar as it is not b^sed on personal
knowledge.

Paragraph 3 of that affidavit (alleges that during its

deliberations the jury became confused regarding the effect their
finding of comparative negligence would have on the parties.
Although the jury may, indeed, have requested additional instruc-
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tions, the reasons for so requesting the instructions are within
the peculiar knowledge of the jurors, and it is speculation on
the part of Mr. Henriod as to the reason for the request.
Counsel for appellant is well aware that such affidavits
are incompetent.

He attempted to get a stipulation that they

could be added to the record but for obvious reasons the stipulation was refused.

The attempt to insert them into the record as

exhibits to appellant's brief is an attempt to improperly
influence the court and should be rejected.

Counsel for

appellant should be censured for such conduct.
II.
THIS COURT'S DECISION IN DIXON v. STEWART
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO THE
PRESENT CASE.
This court has, on a number of occasions, held that
decisions of the court will normally be granted retroactive
application and that such application is not prohibited or
required by constitutional law.
rehearing),

P.2d

Malan v. Lewis (decision on

(Utah 1984); Royal Order of Moose v.

County Board of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982).

The

court may, however, in its discretion, prohibit retroactive
operation where the "overruled law has been justifiably relied
upon or where retroactive operation creates a burden.ff

Royal

Order of Moose v. County Board of Equalisation, 657 P.2d at 265;
Malan v. Lewis, supra.

Malan v. Lewis, supra, decided by this

court on December 14, 1984, determined that retroactive application of the guest statute was not prohibited either by constitu-
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tional law or by justifiable reliance or 4ndue burden.

The court

reached this decision after finding that a showing of justifiable
reliance or undue burden had not been mad^ out by the respondents.
The State of Kansas adopted a rule similar to that in
Dixon v. Stewart, supra, in Thomas v. Boajrd of Trustees of Salem
Township, 582 P.2d 271 (Kan. 1978).

Subsequently, the Kansas

Court of Appeals was faced with the very question here in the
remarkably similar case of Cook v. Doty, 608 P.2d 1028 (Kan.App.
1980).

In that case, the jury returned a verdict finding 80%

negligence on the plaintiff and 20% negligence on the defendant.
The Thomas case, determining that an instruction regarding the
effects of application of comparative negligence should be given
to the jury, was decided approximately two months after the Cook
case was tried.

Plaintiff argued that the decision should have

retroactive application and that he had been prejudiced by the
failure of the court to give such an instruction.

The court

discussed the options available in applying a decision and cited
Vaughn v. Murray, 521 P.2d 262 (Kan. 1974), in listing five
recognized factors commonly relied upon by courts in determining
the retroactivity question:
" f(1) Justifiable reliance! on the earlier
law; (2) The nature and purpose of the
overruling decision; (3) Res judicata; (4)
Vested rights, if any, whicji may have
accrued by reason of the earlier law; and
(5) The effect retroactive application may
have on the administration of justice in
214 Kan. atl 464. 521 P.2d at
the courts.
269. 608 P.2d at 1030.
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In discussing the application of these factors, the
court stated:
In applying the five factors of Vaughn v.
Murray to the case at bar, it appears to
us that (1) the court reasonably relied on
earlier law clearly indicating that the
jury should not be informed of the legal
effect of its special verdict. (2) The
purpose of the Thomas decision was to make
a new policy determination as to the
appropriate rule to be followed in the
instructing of Kansas Juries in comparative negligence cases. It concluded
that the PIK approach was the "better
rule,11 . . . (3) Prospective application
would leave intact judgments entered prior
to the announcement of the Thomas decision, promoting the doctrine of res judicata. (4) There are no vested rights
which have accrued under the earlier law.
The court, in discussing the effect that retroactive
application would have on the administration of justice, cited a
discussion in its decision overruling the Kansas guest statute,
Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362 (Kan. 1974), where the court gave
only prospective application to its overruling of the guest
statute.

The court then went on to state:
The result in Vaughn was that the Henry
decision was given limited retroactive
effect -- it applied to all similar cases
pending when the opinion was filed and
cases filed thereafter regardless of when
the causes of action accrued, but it did
not apply where a judgment or verdict had
been entered prior to that decision and
the same was free of reversible error
under the law then existing.
In continuing its discussion of these policy con-

siderations, the court stated:
A somewhat similar result would appear to
be appropriate in the instant case, based
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on the policy considerations! recognized in
Vaughn. The Thomas decision can be given
application to all similar cases pending
and untried when it was decided on July
21, 1978, and all cases filed thereafter
regardless of when the causes of action
accrued. However, in cases where a
judgment or verdict has beeni entered in a
district court prior to July 21, 1978, and
it is otherwise free of reversible error,
we hold that the judgment should stand
regardless of whether the PIK instruction
issue was raised at trial. jWe make this
distinction from the Vaughn tesult
because, unlike the guest statute revision, Thomas does not affectj a substantive
right of the parties. Instekd, it represents only a choice of procedure on the
basis of desirability, over which there is
room for a substantial difference of opinion. The trial court's decision here
cannot be said to be error, and even if it
were, it did not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.
A similar decision should be reached in the present
case.

The accident which formed the basis of this action

occurred on September 5, 1981, well over three years ago.

Trial

was held commencing November 30, 1982, over two years ago.

The

trial lasted three days, 17 separate witnesses were called and
nearly 150 exhibits were introduced at trial, which have been
subsequently released to respective counsel.

The trial court

reasonably relied upon the then current state of the law, as set
forth in McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 423 (Utah
1974), in instructing the jury.

The McGinn decision was reason-

ably relied upon by the court and an undue burden would result if
a new trial were ordered.

All of the policy considerations

discussed in Cook v. Doty, supra, are applicable to the present
case and the court should rule that the Dixon decision does not
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apply to the present case.
III.
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THE DIXON
DECISION APPLIES TO THE PRESENT CASE, THIS
CASE FITS SQUARELY WITHIN THE EXCEPTION TO
THAT RULING WHERE SUCH AN INSTRUCTION
WOULD LEAD TO CONFUSION AND PREJUDICE TO
THE PARTIES.
A finding that the Dixon decision is applicable to this
case does not require a reversal and remand for new trial.

The

record indicates that the trial court had before it the Dixon
decision and, despite appellant's argument for its application in
the present case, determined that a new trial was not
appropriate.

The court made its decision in a minute entry which

did not specifically discuss the reasoning behind the ruling.
The court did, however, consider memoranda and argument of counsel for appellant and respondents and had before it the decision
of this court in Dixon v. Stewart, supra.

In his motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a
new trial, appellant listed four grounds for his motion:
1.

Said verdict is contrary to law.

2. Said verdict is contrary to the
evidence.
3.
4.
trial.

Inadequate damages were given.
Error in law occurred at the

Appellant's statement of issues presented on appeal,
however, seems to indicate that he is limiting his appeal to
errors in law, and he appears to be relying on the inadequacy of
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damages as indicating confusion on the paijt of the jury.
In reviewing a trial court's rulings pertaining to
motions for a directed verdict, judgment n .o.v. or motion for a
new trial, the Appellate Court grants cons iderable deference to
the trial court decision and reviews the r ecord to determine
whether there is any evidentiary basis whatsoever for the jury's
decision.

If such a basis exists, then the trial court must be

affirmed.

All reasonable inferences which may be drawn as part

of the order are also considered.
(Utah 1977).

McClouq v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125

Although the trial court did not enunciate its

reasons for denying the motion for a new t rial, the record shows
that it did have the Dixon v. Stewart deci sion before it for eonsideration and this court may presume that it correctly applied
that decision, finding that this case pres<ented exactly the type
of complicated and confusing situation whi<ch warranted a refusal
to give an instruction on the effects of aj finding of comparative
negligence.
This case was originally brought |by Annette Belden
against Dalbo, Inc. and Dale Peel for injuries received in the
accident and the defendants filed a third- party complaint against
the appellant claiming contribution.
counterclaim for his damages.

The (appellant then filed a

Prior to trlial, the plaintiff's

case was settled for $285,000, which settl ement was approved by
the court and by the appellant and his counsel.

A concern of

instructing the jury regarding their appor Itionment of negligence
was that it would necessarily require the court to inform the
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jury that the respondent was claiming contribution against the
appellant for a portion of the $285,000 settlement.

An addi-

tional issue presented at the time of trial, which a subsequent
decision of this court has rendered moot, was whether the road
upon which this accident occurred was a private road or a public
road for purposes of applying the Utah guest statute.
Instructing the jury regarding the effects of their finding of
comparative negligence would have required evidence of the
settlement between plaintiff, Annette Belden, and defendants
which would, certainly, have further confused the jury with
regard to the effects of their finding and which would most certainly have prejudiced the defendants.

Evidence of the settle-

ment could lead the jury to believe that the settlement was an
admission of liability, despite specific Utah statutory authority
otherwise.
To properly advise the jury of the results of its deliberations would also have required the court to give instructions
to the jury regarding the then valid Utah guest statute and the
effects of their findings on whether the road on which the accident occurred was a private road or a public road.

This would

have placed a number of legal issues before the jury which are
more properly decided by the court and would have created sufficient confusion to prevent the jury from properly deciding the
issues appropriately before them.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in ruling that a jury should be
made aware of the effects of its findings of comparative negli-
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gence, also recognized this exception in $eppi v. Betty, 579 P.2d
683 (Idaho 1978).

In setting out this exception, the court

stated:
. . . Though we believe in iiiost cases such
an instruction is fully warranted, we
conclude that the trial courts should be
given discretion not to so inform the jury
in those cases where the issues are so
complex or the legal isuses so uncertain
that such instructions woul<fl confuse or
mislead the jury.
Appellant has argued that the amounts of damages awarded
by the jury are so inadequate as to indicate that the jury
reduced the amount of damages to what it felt the plaintiff
should recover and was thereby confused by the failure of the
trial court to grant instructions regarding the effects of comparative negligence.

The jury awarded the full amount of plain-

tiff's medical expenses and lost income damages in the amount of
$28,000.

Lost future income was found to be $20,000 and general

damages were found to be $5,000.

Although the general damages

may appear to be low, they are certainly within the prerogative
of the jury.

Since medical damages were not compromised and lost

earnings, both present and future, were well within the testimony
of plaintiff's expert, there is no evidence of compromise on
those damages.

Thus, it does not appear that the jury was con-

fused or compromised general damages.
The situation present in Dixon simply does not apply
here.

The jury's finding of negligence was 70% on the plaintiff

and 30% on the defendant.

There was no indication of a contrary

finding later changed by the jury, as in Mxon, nor was there a
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50/50 finding of negligence with which the court was concerned in
Seppi v, Betty, supra.
Appellant apparently feels that the court could have
informed the jury of the effects of its finding of comparative
negligence without informing them of the out-of-court settlement
between Annette Belden and the defendants.

It is difficult to

see how this could be done since the first claim brought between
appellant and respondents was respondents1 third-party complaint
for contribution.

To be fair to both the appellant and respon-

dents, the court would have to instruct the jury that a finding
of 50% or more negligence on Dalbo would reduce considerably
defendant's contribution claim.

To inform them of this, however,

would clearly have prejudiced the defendant by admitting evidence
of that settlement.

It is clear that the trial court was correct

in denying the motion for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial and
that the present case fits squarely within the exception of the
Dixon v. Stewart rule.
IV.
EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S RELATIONSHIP
WITH ANNETTE BELDEN WAS RELEVANT TO THE
ISSUES BEING DECIDED AND WAS NOT
PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPELLANT.
The appellant has cited as a claim of error the
admission into evidence on cross-examination of the plaintiff's
testimony regarding the fact that the plaintiff was on a hunting
trip with a woman, not his wife, although he was married.

In

various portions of his brief, the appellant mentions that evi-
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dence of the extra-marital affair was prejudicial to him.

A

review of the testimony cited in appellant's brief, however,
shows that there was never any imputation of any kind of sexual
activity between the plaintiff-appellant knd Annette Belden.
Plaintiff-appellant was merely asked whether he was concerned
about his wife finding out about the trip.

Sleeping arrangement*

and any sexual contact between plaintiff-appellant and Annette
Belden was specifically not discussed on cross-examination.

The

evidence at trial indicated that the plaintiff was not looking
forward a sufficient distance in front of him while operating his
motorcycle and this cross-examination attempted to determine if
he had other things on his mind that detracted him from the
operation of the motorcycle.
The appellant also improperly characterizes the jury as
being overwhelmingly Mormon.

In addition to the fact that this

does not appear from the record, it improperly ascribes prejudice
and bias to all members of a religious group and is clearly not
supported by any evidence whatsoever.
It is a well-recognized principld that the admissibiliy
of evidence is for the trial court to determine and the trial
court's decision will be given great defer ence, absent a clear
abuse of discretion.

Terry v. Zion's Coop erative Mercantile

Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979).

The trial court

apparently felt that the plaintiff's state of mind at the time of
the accident was relevant to the issues of this case and that
evidence of the plaintiff's marriage at thb time he was spending
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time with Annette Belden could sufficiently impact on his state
of mind as to be a contributing cause of the accident.

There

simply was no evidence of any extra-marital affair or sexual contact between the plaintiff and Annette Belden and no attempt was
made to introduce such evidence.

There was no abuse of discre-

tion in the admission of this evidence and no basis exists for an
overruling of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The affidavits submitted as part of appellant's brief
are improper and should be stricken from the brief.
Under general rules of retroactive application of decisions, the Dixon v. Stewart case should be given only limited
retroactive effect and should not apply to the present case.
Even if Dixon v. Stewart is applied to the present case,
it is clear that the complicated relationships between the parties and their various claims among one another as well as the
numerous legal issues to be determined in the case clearly place
the present case in the exception to the Dixon v. Stewart rule
which allows the court to refuse to instruct the jury on the
effects of their finding of comparative negligence in a particularly complicated or confusing case.
No evidence was admitted of any type of extra-marital
affair or sexual relationship between the plaintiff and Annette
Belden and that evidence which was admitted was clearly relevant
to the plaintiff's state of mind and was not prejudicial to the
plaintiff.

There was no error on the part of the trial court and
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the judgment based on the jury verdict sh<buld be upheld,
Dated this

day of

|

, 1985.

STRONG & HANNI

By_

Henry El Heath
Attorneys I for Respondents
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